WELFARE REFORM, WORK-RELATED CHILD
CARE, AND TAX POLICY:
THE "FAMILY VALUES" DOUBLE STANDARD

Mary L. Heen*

INTRODUCTION

The welfare reform legislation signed into law last year repeals the
entitlement to welfare and imposes strict time limits on the receipt of
benefits.2 98 Although federal work requirements have been in effect for
nearly thirty years, the new law requires the states to meet more stringent
work participation levels 299 and makes the work requirements applicable
to mothers with younger children. 300 The shift in the welfare paradigm
toward mandatory wage work for mothers with young children has not
* Copyright © 1997 Mary L. Heen.
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298 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub L.
No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112-13, 2137 (repealing individual entitlement to
welfare and imposing a twenty-four month limit on welfare benefits without work and a
sixty month lifetime cap on benefits) [hereinafter Personal Responsibility Act of 1996].
299 Id. § 103, 110 Stat. at 2129 (requiring states to meet a minimum work
participation
rate of 50% by fiscal year 2002).
300 Id. § 103, 110 Stat. at 2131 (permitting States to exempt parents of a child under age
one from the work requirement); Id. § 103, 110 Stat. at 2132 (providing that for purposes
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to obtain needed child care," including the unavailability or unsuitability of "informal
child care" by a relative or under other arrangements). For a discussion of the work
requirements imposed under prior law, see discussion infra Part IA.

been accompanied, however, by a corresponding policy shift toward
universal or affordable child care.
Historically, federal welfare and labor policies have impeded women's
access to the wage labor market through the lack of affordable child
care.3 ° 1 Tax policies have contributed to the problem.3 °2 Efforts to
improve women's access to the wage labor market have clashed with
policies aimed at reinforcing traditional family values. The policy conflict
between increased labor market participation by women and
reinforcement of traditional "family values" reflects race- and class-based
double standards in the treatment of work and child care by both the
income tax and the income transfer (welfare) systems.
Tax policies evidence a tension between reinforcing traditional family
values and improving the access of women to the wage labor market.
Congress has articulated various reasons for the tax allowance for workrelated child care; it has analogized work-related child care to other
business-related costs of producing income and at the same time has
treated it as a hardship allowance for families disrupted by the death or
disability of the primary breadwinner (usually the husband and father) or
the death or disability of the primary caregiver (usually the wife and
mother). In the early 1970s Congress linked the child care deduction to
welfare- related work programs and expanded the deduction to encourage
3
the employment of welfare recipients in household service positions.
Policymakers also have periodically addressed child care issues by
providing additional or alternative tax allowances for families with
children through increased exemption amounts for dependents or by
advocating refundable or nonrefundable per child tax credits. 30 4 These tax
adjustments are sometimes described as promoting traditional family
values because they do not tie eligibility for the tax allowance to the
parents' work outside of the home. Child tax credit proposals directed at
the middle class have recently received renewed political support, and a
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$500 per child tax credit has been enacted as the centerpiece of the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.3o5

In requiring wage work of welfare mothers with young children,
policymakers assume that the care welfare mothers provide their own
children does not constitute work at least equivalent in value to the wage
work available to welfare recipients (including child care they may
provide to other people's children); 30 6 alternatively, they assume that the
wage work required of welfare recipients will produce long-term benefits
greater than the intervening cost of providing (or not providing) substitute
child care for their children. 30 7 At best those assumptions evidence an
305 During the last session of Congress, although House and Senate conferees agreed to
a

nonrefundable $500 per child tax credit, phasing out the credit at adjusted gross incomes
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each qualifying child under the age of 17. The credit phases out beginning at modified
adjusted gross incomes of $110,000 in the case of joint returns, $75,000 for unmarried
individuals, and $55,000 for married individuals filing separately. Although generally a
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REv. 879, 881-83 (1994); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26
CoNN. L. REv. 871, 873-75 (1994).
307 See Lance Liebman, Evaluating Child Care Legislation: Program
Structures and
Political Consequences, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 357, 360-61 (1989) (questioning whether
it is important that single mothers work even if child care costs more than their shortterm earnings); see also Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses,
1991 DUKE L. J. 274.

underestimation of the cost of quality substitute child care. At worst they
reveal an entrenched race- or class-based devaluation of the care provided
by welfare recipients to their children. Without the provision of adequate
substitute child care, the work requirements represent an attempt to shift
welfare mothers into poorly paid service positions while tacitly expecting
that their child care responsibilities will be met by neighbors and relatives,
including the aunts, siblings, and grandmothers of the children now
receiving welfare. In any event the largely unstated assumptions suggest
disturbing race, gender, and class stereotyping at work, 30along
with a return
8
to certain pre-entitlement era approaches to poor relief.
On the one hand tax policies favor the in-home provision of child care
and household services by mothers in certain "traditional" two parent
households and facilitate the employment of child care providers if the
single parent or secondary wage earner (usually the wife) can earn enough
after taxes in the wage labor market to pay for child care and other
household services. On the other hand welfare policies reject the in-home
provision of child care for poor mothers. Low-income families are
generally unable to afford adequate child care without additional
government subsidies or the modification of current tax provisions. The
interrelationship of tax and welfare policies thus creates a classic double
bind for poor families and suggests an apparent race- and class-based
double standard.
The implications of the double standard applied to the poor through
the tax system are troubling, and worthy of further examination. This
essay begins a preliminary exploration of the interrelationship between tax
and welfare double standards. In the welfare context, discussed in Part I, a
double standard historically has been applied by making race-based
distinctions between the "deserving" and the "undeserving" poor.
Although the discriminatory denial of welfare benefits largely ended as a
result of major reforms achieved by the welfare rights movement in the
1960s, 30 9 welfare reform eliminates the structural "entitlement" to benefits
on which those reforms were built. In the tax context, discussed in Part II,
a family values double standard may be identified through the close
correlation between an individual's race or gender and his or her family
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income or wealth. 310 Traditional family values are reinforced through the
tax code; nevertheless, access to the wage labor market has been improved
for middle- and upper-income women through offsetting tax allowances
for work- related child care. Those adjustments are not generally
available, however, to low-income working families. The tax double
standard may be eliminated only through offsetting adjustments or more
comprehensive changes in the income tax system.

I. WELFARE, WORK AND THE MOTHERS OF YOUNG CHILDREN

A. The HistoricalRace-Based Double Standard
Federal work requirements for welfare recipients represent a shift
away from the origins in 1935 of the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)
program, which developed from "mothers' pensions" or "mothers' aid"
programs.3 1 Such programs were intended by social reformers to enable
widows and certain other "deserving" mothers with "suitable homes" to
care for their young children without being compelled to work outside of
the home. 312 Local welfare offices, particularly those in the South, used
the "suitable home" and other rules to deny assistance to AfricanAmerican children and their families. 313 In addition, long before the
federal government imposed work requirements, some states used
"employable mother" rules to deny welfare assistance to women with
children, especially nonwhite women, on the ground that they should
work.314 The first employable mother rule was adopted by Louisiana in
1943, refusing ADC assistance to families during times when the mothers
315
and their older children were needed to work in the cotton fields.
Georgia adopted a similar rule in 1952, denying assistance to mothers
with children over three years of age if "suitable" employment (at any
wage) was deemed to be available. 316 Thus, local welfare policies
coincided with local labor market demands by keeping nonwhite women
in seasonal agricultural and other labor pools.3 17 As late as 1966 New
310

For a discussion of this correlation, see Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage

Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in TAXING AMERICA 45 (Karen B. Brown and Mary
Louise Fellows eds., 1996) [hereinafter TAXING AMERICA]; John A. Powell, How
Government Tax and HousingPolicies Have Racially Segregated America, id. at 80.
311 E.g., ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 11, at 181-206, 315-19; WINIFRED
BELL, AID TO
DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3-75 (1965); GORDON, supra note 11, at 37-64, 253-85.

Historically, poor women, including mothers, have had to work for wages out of
necessity. See, e.g., ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGEEARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, viii, 16-19, 119-27 (1982); PIVEN &
312

CLOWARD, supra note 12, at 3-41, 123-45.
313 BELL, supra note 14, at 174-94.
314 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 12, at 138.

See id. at 134; Bell, supra note 14, at 46 (noting that "[i]n one parish, the policy
extended to children as young as 7 years of age").
316 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 12, at 134-35.
317 BELL, supra note 14, at 46, 107, 141.
311

Jersey notified Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
recipients that their grants would be cut because seasonal farm work was
318
available.
Federal work requirements were first imposed on welfare recipients by
the Work Incentive Program (WIN) in 1967. WIN was not very effective,
however, due to weak funding and enforcement. 319 Although potentially
subject to the original WIN work requirements, mothers with preschool
children were determined by many states to be "inappropriate" for job
training or work and thus exempt from the work requirement. 320 As
amended in 1971, WIN II
required participation by mothers with children
32 1
six years of age or older.
The WIN program was replaced by the Job Opportunity and Basic
Skills Program (JOBS), which was established by the Family Support Act
of 1988.3 The Family Support Act mandated improved procedures for
child support enforcement and the establishment of paternity; guaranteed
federal assistance for child care during participation in education, training,
and employment (AFDC-related child care); and provided transitional
eligibility for a year of extended child care and medical assistance for
former AFDC recipients who became ineligible for AFDC because of
increased income from employment (Transitional Child Care).32 3 Unless
exempted by law, AFDC recipients were required to participate in
JOBS. 324 Mothers caring for a child under six years of age were required
to participate in JOBS only if child care were guaranteed and participation
were limited to twenty hours per week.3 25 Those caring for children under
three years of age were exempt from participation, unless required to
participate under State option.326 Most states, however, exempted

3 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 11, at 333.
319 JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERT:

WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 141-42 (WIN I), 156-58 (WIN II) (1991).
32' ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 11, at 341 (attributing the exemption to limited funding, a
lack of child care, and an excess of welfare recipients over WIN slots).
321 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 22, at 154.
322 Family Support Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988)).
323 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 998, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988). Under the Family Support
Act, families were eligible for Transitional Child Care "for a period of 12 months after
the last month for which the family received [AFDC]," 42 U.S.C. §
602(g)(1)(A)(iii)(1988), if they "received [AFDC] in at least 3 of 6 months immediately
preceding the month in which the family became ineligible for [AFDC]." 42 U.S.C. §
602(g)(1)(A)(iv)(1988). Families contributed to the cost of child care under a sliding
scale formula established by the state. 42 U.S.C. § 602(g)(1)(A)(vii)(1988). The program
otherwise generally operated under the same rules as the child care program for AFDC
recipients.
324 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(1)(i) (1988).
32'42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(C)(iii)(II) (1988).
326 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(C)(iii)(I) (1988).

caretakers

of327 children under the age of three

from the work

requirements.

The shift in welfare policy toward work requirements occurred as the
welfare population expanded and as more African-American and other
women of color and their families were added to the rolls.328 The shift also
coincided with the trend of increased labor market participation by women
with young children. 329 Although AFDC mothers have been reported as
participating in the labor market at significantly lower levels than their
nonwelfare counterparts, 330 studies conducted by the Institute for
Women's Policy Research show more comparable labor-force
participation levels. 33 1 Like many of their counterparts in the labor market,
AFDC mothers do not earn enough on their own to support themselves
327

Compare HOUSE
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104th Cong., 2d Sess., OVERVIEW OF
8-4 (Comm. Print 1996)
only those caretakers with
children under age one, and three states and the Virgin Islands exempting those with
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, 1996 GREENBOOK, 404-08, tbl.
[hereinafter 1996 GREENBOOK] (listing ten states exempting

children under age two) with HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, 1994 GREENBOOK, 344-48, tbl. 10-4

(Comm. Print 1994) [hereinafter 1994 GREENBOOK] (listing eight states exempting only
those caretakers with children under age one, and four states and the Virgin Islands
exempting those with children under age two).
328 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 12, at 341, app. source tbls. 1, 4.
329 See generally, Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their
Children,26
CONN. L. REV. 817, 826-31 (1994) (rejecting the argument that "work requirements for
mothers on welfare simply reflect the changing social expectations of all women").
330 1996 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 474 (reporting that in 1994, 3.3% of
AFDC
mothers were employed in a full-time job and 4.6% were employed in a part-time job);
1994 Greenbook, supra note 30, at 404 n.2 (reporting that in 1992, 16.1% of AFDC
mothers or other caretakers were at school or training, 2.2% worked more than 30 hours
per week, and 4.2% worked fewer than 30 hours per week); see also Ann L. Alstott, The
Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108
HARV. L. REV. 533, 546-47 n.52 (1995) (stating that studies typically show that few
AFDC recipients work and citing other studies indicating that a majority of women work
at some point while receiving welfare). In comparison, about 56.8% of married women
whose youngest child is under six participate in the labor force. See Minow, supra note
32, at 827 n.53 (citing figures based on census data from 1987); see also Lucy A.
Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals,
102 YALE L. J. 719, 745 n.173 (1992) ("Of women with children under the age of six,
64% worked at some time during the year, although only 25% worked full-time yearround.").
331 Heidi Hartmann & Roberta Spalter-Roth, Reducing Welfare's Stigma: Policies That Build upon
CommonalitiesAmong Women, 26 CONN. L. REV. 901, 908 (1994). They found as follows:

On average, mothers work in paid employment about half time, devoting the other half of the "normal"
work week as well as the "second shift" to child and family care. Our research shows that about forty
percent of poor mothers receiving AFDC are also working in paid employment, and they work
approximately half time, about as much as all mothers. Id.

and their children; many need both their welfare benefits and their
earnings to survive. Because AFDC was not otherwise structured to
encourage work effort, the33 paid work of welfare recipients has sometimes
been driven underground.
B. Child Care Funding Under JOBS and Under the New Welfare Reform
Law
As discussed above, the JOBS program was created in the last round
of welfare reform during the late 1980s. The JOBS program was funded
through a capped entitlement under which states were partially reimbursed
(pursuant to a federal matching rate) for each dollar spent on JOBS until
they reached the maximum amount allocated to them. 333 Federal funds for
guaranteed JOBS-related child care were separately provided as openended entitlement matching funds to partially reimburse (at the Medicaid
matching rate) state expenditures for AFDC-related child care and
Transitional Child Care. 334 As of the end of fiscal year 1993, states had
drawn down only about 70% of the allotted $1 billion in federal JOBS
funds. 335 State budget constraints as well as the cost of guaranteed child
care were among the reasons identified for the less-than-full
implementation of the JOBS program. In many states the same amount
3 36
was spent on JOBS-related child care as on the JOBS program itself.

The At-Risk Child Care Program provided federal matching funds for
states to provide child care services for low-income families who were "at
risk" of becoming welfare recipients if they did not receive work-related
child care. 337 Families were required to contribute to the338cost of care on a
sliding fee schedule based on the family's ability to pay.
Low-income families also received child care assistance through
various federal block grant programs, which survive the new welfare
reform law in modified form. The Child Care and Development Block
Grant (CCDBG) program provides funding for child care services to lowincome families, as well as for efforts to improve the quality and
Id. See also 1996 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 472 (citing studies).
1994 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 342, 789.
42 U.S.C. § 602(g)(3) (1988). See 1994 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 342.
1994 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 349, tbl. 10-5.
Hearingon the Job Opportunitiesand Basic Skills Program: Views from Participants
and State Administrators Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 75-76 (1994) (statement of
Raymond C. Scheppach, Executive Director, National Governor's Association); see 1994
Greenbook, supra note 30, at 349, tbl. 10-5 ($646.6 million total federal funds expended
on JOBS in 1993, compared to $582.5 million in JOBS-related child care). In fiscal year
1995, $855 million was expended on AFDC child care and for Transitional Child Care.
1996 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 658, tbl. 10-13.
337 The program was authorized as a capped entitlement at $300 million annually. 42
U.S.C. § 603(n)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
338 42 U.S.C. § 602(i)(3)(A) (1988).
332
333
334
331
336

availability of child care in general. 339 Federal funds are distributed to
states under a formula, and no matching funds are required. In addition to
the CCDBG program, some child care funds are available through the
Social Services Block Grant Program of Title XX of the Social Security
Act. 340 Title XX block grants operate as a capped entitlement, with no
state matching requirement, under which states are allocated funds
pursuant to a formula based on their relative population. Most states spend
some portion of their block grants on child care services, and some but not
all states 34
determine
eligibility for child care services based on income
1
standards.
Under pre-welfare reform federal child care funding levels, 342 states
were unable to meet the need for child care assistance for low-income
families. 343 Between 5 and 6% of the AFDC caseload received AFDC
child care subsidies, 344 and only about one-third of JOBS participants
received JOBS-related child care. 345 About 20% of those eligible received
Transitional Child Care assistance for the first year after leaving welfare
for work.346 Families that used up their one year of guaranteed transitional
339 42 U.S.C. § § 9858, 9858b-9858n (Supp. 1997) (amending 42 U.S.C. § § 9858,

9858a-9858q (1995)).
340 42 U.S.C. § § 1397 (1992), 1397a-1397f (1992 & Supp. 1997) (Social Services Block
Grant Program of Title XX of the Social Security Act).
341 For a discussion of these programs, see Mary L. Heen, Welfare Reform, Child Care
Costs, and Taxes: Delivering Increased Work-Related Child Care Benefits to LowIncome Families, 13 YALE L. & POLY REV. 173 (1995).

at 181-82 (stating that federal child care assistance totaled roughly $2.05 billion
for fiscal year 1993, not including amounts expended on programs such as Head Start
and the Child and Adult Care Food Program). See 1996 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at
643, tbl. 10-12, 651 (showing 1995 fiscal year federal outlays of $633 million in AFDCrelated child care, $192 million for Transitional Child Care, $279 million for At-Risk
Child Care, and $933 million for Child Care and Development Block Grants, totaling
$2.037 billion; if an estimated portion of Title XX social services block grants supporting
child care were included, the total of $2.037 billion would be increased an additional $71
million, or approximately 16% of $448 million, to about $2.1 billion).
343 See Ann Collins & Barbara Reisman, Child Care under the Family Support Act:
Guarantee, Quasi-Entitlement, or Paper Promise?, 11 YALE L. & POLY REV. 203
(1993).
344 U.S. General Accounting Office, Child Care: Working Poor and Welfare Recipients
Face Service Gaps 4-5 (GAO/HEHS-94-87, May 1994) [hereinafter GAO Child Care
Report] (based on preliminary fiscal year 1992 data reported to the Department of Health
and Human Services by the states).
345 See Impact of Welfare Reform on the Child Care System: HearingsBefore the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1995)
(statement of Sandra L. Hofferth, University of Michigan Institute for Social Research)
(citing reports published in 1991 and 1992) [hereinafter Hearings]. But see 1996
GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 647 (citing 1995 GAO report that "about three-fourths
of State JOBS Programs have been able to provide child care subsidies or help arrange
child care for all or most of their participants who needed such assistance," and noting
that "GAO attributed this success to the relatively small number of AFDC recipients
actually participating in JOBS--about 13 percent of the adult caseload in a given month").
346 Hearings,supra note 48 (basing testimony on transitional care data from 20 states).
342Id.

assistance after leaving welfare had to compete with other low-income,
non-AFDC families for child care assistance. Surveys conducted in 1993
and 1994 found that most states either had lengthy waiting lists for child
care assistance or had stopped accepting new applications. 347 In addition,
the competition for slots resulted in the shifting of scarce state child 348
care
funds from low-income working families to families receiving AFDC.
Experience with prior work programs indicates that those with low
reimbursement rates and retroactive reimbursement tended to steer
families toward informal child care. 349 Such informal arrangements are
also more likely to be of relatively poor quality. A recent study concluded
that children who are in the care of family and relatives are receiving
substandard care from providers who are "taking care of children to help
out the mothers and not because they want to care for children." 3 50 The
study's authors recommended that low-income families receive a child
care subsidy sufficient to pay for higher quality care. 351 In addition, the
authors recommended against requiring welfare recipients to become
family child care providers and urged states to screen all welfare-to-work
recipients for
interest, commitment, and aptitude before they become
352
providers.

The new welfare reform law repeals "entitlement" programs such as
AFDC and AFDC-related child care and substitutes two separate capped
federal block grants to the states, giving the states the freedom to impose
their own requirements or restrictions without the necessity of applying
for waivers of federal requirements. 353 The new law cuts the projected
growth in overall welfare spending by approximately $55 billion over the

347 CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN

YEARBOOK 42 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 YEARBOOK] (finding that eight states had at
least 10,000 children on the child care assistance waiting lists); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE
FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN YEARBOOK 32 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 YEARBOOK] (finding that 31 states and the District of Columbia had waiting
lists).
348 GAO Child Care Report, supra note 47, at 15; 1994 Yearbook, supra note 50, at 34;
1995 Yearbook, supra note 50, at 41-42.
349 1994 Yearbook, supra note 50, at 35.
350 ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., THE STUDY OF CHILDREN IN FAMILY CHILD
CARE
AND RELATIVE CARE: HIGHLIGHTS OF FINDINGS 5,97 (1994).
351
[d. at 97.

352 [d.

353 See Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, supra note 1; see also 1996 Greenbook,

supra note 30, at 434 (stating that by mid-February 1996, all but 10 states had received
waivers from AFDC provisions and listing examples of waivers approved). See generally
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Devolution Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995, at
D15 (describing the "devolution" of federal authority to the states under proposed
welfare reform legislation).

354 It also increases the projected number of children in
next six35years.
5
poverty.

In place of AFDC and JOBS, the new law creates a welfare block
grant called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) capped at
$16.4 billion per year, approximately the level of federal welfare
expenditures in 1995. Implementation of TANF is effective July 31,
1997,
56
although states may implement their block grant programs sooner.
The new block grant for child care, effective October 1, 1996, is an
expanded and revised version of the Child Care and Development Block
Grant Program (CCDBG), and replaces AFDC-related child care,
Transitional Child Care, and the At-Risk Child Care programs. 357 The new
child care block grant largely consolidates federal child care programs,
funded at 1995 levels of just over $2 billion per year (provided through
numerous separate programs), 358 into one block grant program of about $3
billion in total funds in fiscal year 1997, increasing to $3.7 billion by
fiscal year 2002. 35 9 Although the new law adds limited amounts over 1995
funding levels for work-related child care, the amounts provided fall far
short of what would be needed to move families off the welfare rolls and
to keep them off on a long-term basis. Without substantially increased
federal or state support of work-related child care, the new work
requirements may be programmed for failure, or worse, they may result in
the endangerment of children.
If low-income families must pay the full cost of child care themselves,
they face a major obstacle in their transition from welfare to work. In
general the type of child care purchased and the amount spent on care
varies by the family's economic situation and the type of care used.
Lower-income families spend on average about 25% of their incomes on
314 1996 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 1331.
355 Alison Mitchell, GreaterPoverty Toll Is Seen in Welfare Bill, But White House Says It

May Be Forced to Accept Senate Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at A27
(referencing studies).
356 See Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, supra note 1 (authorizing states to use up
to
30% of their TANF block grants for other purposes, including for Title XX and Child
Care and Development Block Grant programs); 1996 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at
1333.
357
See supra text accompanying notes 26, 40, and 42.
358 See supra note 45 (explaining computation).
359 1996 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, app. L at 1362-63 (explaining that discretionary
funds are provided through reauthorization of CCDBG through fiscal year 2002 at an
annual authorization level of $1 billion and that entitlement funds for child care are
authorized at $2 billion in fiscal year 1997, $2.1 billion in 1998, $2.2 billion in 1999,
$2.4 billion in 2000, $2.6 billion in 2001, and $2.7 billion in 2002; of the entitlement
funds, no state match is required for about $1.2 billion each year, which is the amount
provided to the states in 1995 for AFDC-related child care, Transitional Child Care, and
At-Risk Child Care; and the remainder of the entitlement funds are subject to historic
maintenance-of-effort and matching requirements).

child care even though they spend significantly less, in absolute terms, on
child care than families with higher incomes. 36 Without subsidized child
care, low-income families will likely rely on lower-quality child care or
informal arrangements and relative-provided care. Those who pay
relatives to care for their children pay the lowest average weekly costs,
with increasingly higher weekly average costs for family child care, center
care, and in-home care by a nonrelative.
The family and relative care received by children from low-income
families and the center-based care for very young children have raised
developmental concerns. A recent study of children in family child care
and relative care concluded that "regardless of maternal education, the
lower the child's family income, the lower the quality of the child care
home in which he or she is enrolled. 3 61 That finding differed from
research findings on center-based care, in which low-income children in
subsidized care often were in better-quality arrangements than middleincome children. 36 2 In center-based care, the lowest quality care is
received by toddlers and infants, with about 40% of those studied
receiving below a minimally adequate level, although little difference
in
36 3
care.
quality
lowor
highproviding
centers
for
found
fees was

II. TAXES AND WORK: FAMILY VALUES AND ACCESS TO THE WAGE LABOR
MARKET

A. A History of CongressionalApproaches
Congress has combined at least two or three notions in its approach to
work-related child care costs for income tax purposes. Although it has
treated child care expenses as comparable to an employee business
expense, it has also targeted the deduction or credit to hardship situations

360

See 1996 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 636-37 (stating that "lower income

families devoted 25% of their income to child care, while the higher income families
spent less than 6% of their income for child care"); SANDRA L. HOFFERTH, ET AL.,
NATIONAL CHILD CARE SURVEY, 1990, at 119-96, 198-99 (1991) (defining child
care as care provided while the mother is at work, and including care provided by fathers,
mothers, and children themselves); Hearings, supra note 48, at 202 (in 1990, only 27%
of the working poor paid for child care; the working poor who paid for child care spent
about 33% of their incomes on child care, compared with 13% for working-class and 6%
for middle-class families).
361 GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 53, at 90.
3 62
Id.

at 91.

QUALITY & CHILD OUTCOMES STUDY TEAM, ECONOMICS DEPT.,
U. OF COLO. AT DENVER, ET AL., COST, QUALITY, AND CHILD OUTCOMES
IN CHILD CARE CENTERS at Executive Summary 2, 5 (1995) (finding also that the
average center in the study expended $95 per week per child for full-time care).
363 COST,

and used the allowance as part of an overall effort to364develop jobs for
household workers, including former welfare recipients.
Congress first provided a tax adjustment for employment-related child
care costs in 1954, 365 as a type of working expense deduction targeted to
those in hardship situations such as widows, widowers, and low-income
families. 366 Over the next two decades, Congress increased the statutory
dollar amounts and expanded the coverage of the child care provision, but
retained the basic structure of a child care deduction.
In the 1970s the rationale for the deduction shifted to include a job
development purpose in addition to its continued function as a type of
employee business expense in hardship situations. 367 When the deduction
was significantly expanded in 1971, the Senate committee report
identified it as a "job development deduction for household services and
child care," and discussed it immediately following its description of a
proposed tax credit for salaries paid welfare recipients under the WIN
program. 368 When discussing the proposed WIN tax credit, the committee
observed that the WIN program "has not been as successful as had been
hoped, largely because persons have been placed in institutional rather
than employment-based training." 369 The expanded child care deduction
was intended to provide an incentive for the employment of household
workers by giving large numbers of welfare recipients "the opportunity to
perform socially desirable services in jobs that are vitally needed," while
also helping "to remove these individuals from
the welfare rolls and
370
reduce the cost of providing public assistance."
In 1976 Congress changed the child care deduction to a nonrefundable
tax credit by repealing the deduction provision and adopting the
For a more detailed discussion of the legislative history of the child care tax credit and
its predecessors, see, for example, Alan L. Feld, Deductibilityof Expenses for Child Care
and Household Services: New Section 214, 27 TAX L. REV. 415 (1972); Heen, supra
note 44, at 211-14; John B. Keane, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Child Care
Expenses, 10 HARV J. LEGIS. 2-7 (1972); William A. Klein, Tax Deductionsfor Family
Care Expenses, 14 BOSTON C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 917, 919-32, 936-37 (1973). See
also Wendy Gerzog Shaller, Limit Deductions for Mixed Personal/BusinessExpenses:
Curb CurrentAbuses and Restore Some Progressivity Into the Tax Code, 41 CATH. L.
REV. 581, 606-609 (1992) (describing the § 129 exclusion for dependent care
assistance).
365 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591-736, 68A Stat.
70 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 214) (repealed 1976).
366 See H.R. REP. NO. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted
in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4019, 4055 (a detailed discussion of the technical provisions of the bill is
printed in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4137, 4197-98).
367 See S. REP. NO. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, 59-62 (1971), reprinted
in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N.
1918,
1929,
1966-68.
368
364

Id. at 1928-29.
Id. at 1928.
370
Id. at 1929.
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predecessor of the current child care tax credit. 37 1 The change to a tax
credit was adopted as a way to reach taxpayers who elect the standard
deduction, and as a simplification measure. 372 Although the family income
limitation amounts were eliminated and eligibility requirements were
somewhat broadened, the credit otherwise retained the basic design of the
373
earlier provisions with regard to determination of qualified expenses.
The credit was changed again in 1981, resulting in the current child care
tax credit structure. 374 Although the Senate version of the credit included
refundability, the conference agreement rejected making the credit
refundable.375 The credit was redesignated in 1984,376 and Congress did
some fine-tuning to curtail perceived abuses or to make technical
adjustments in 1987, 377 and again in 1988. 378 No major changes have been

made to the credit since 1981.
B. The Income Tax Work-Related Child Care Provisions
The Internal Revenue Code provisions specifically addressing child
care expenses are I.R.C. § 21, the child and dependent care tax credit, and
I.R.C. § 129, the exclusion from income for certain employer-provided
child care benefits. The child care tax credit and the exclusion for
employer-provided child care are estimated to reduce federal revenues by
about $2.8 billion and $.8 billion, respectively, in fiscal year 1997. 379
Although not specifically aimed at the child care expenses of working
parents, the earned income tax credit, I.R.C. § 32, provides a refundable
tax credit for certain low-income working families with children. In
addition, the personal exemption deduction for dependents, I.R.C. § 151,
and the recently enacted child tax credit, I.R.C. § 24, provide tax
adjustments to account for the added household costs of supporting
children. 380 I.R.C. §§ 21 and 129 provide tax benefits to all working
371

I.R.C. § 44A (1976).

372 H.R. REP. NO. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 147-48 (1976), reprinted in 1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3040-41; S. REP. NO. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, 132-33
(1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3565-66.
373 I.R.C. § 44A(c) (1976 & 1978).
374 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 124, 95 Stat. 172, 197-201
(codified at I.R.C. § § 44A, 129).
375 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 195, 200-201 (1981), reprinted in
1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 285,290-91.
376 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 471(c)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 826.
377 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10101, 101 Stat. 1330384 (codified at I.R.C. § 21(b)(2)(A)).
378 Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 703, 102 Stat. 2343, 242627;
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 2004, 102
Stat. 3342, 3598.
379 Joint Committee on Taxation, Staff Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 1997-2001 (JCS-11-96) 19, 26 (Nov. 26, 1996), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 229, at L-1, L-7, L-10, (Nov. 27, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 JCT Tax
Expenditure Estimates].
380 See I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (providing for the phaseout of personal exemptions for
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes above certain threshold amounts); see, e.g.,

parents, but upper- and middle-income taxpayers utilize them the most,
for reasons explained below. The following subpart describes in greater
detail how the child care credit and employer-provided child care
exclusion provisions work, and how the current design of these provisions
makes it difficult for low-income taxpayers to benefit from them.
1. How the Child Care Tax Credit Works
I.R.C. § 21 provides a nonrefundable tax credit, the amount of which is
equal to an "applicable percentage" 38 1 of the eligible employment-related
child care expenses 382 paid by the taxpayer during the year. 383 The
applicable percentage, which ranges on a sliding scale of 20 to 30%,
varies with adjusted gross income. The amount of child care expenses that
384
may be taken into account depends upon the number of children
included in the household maintained by the taxpayer. Eligible expenses
are limited to $2,400 per year for one child, and $4,800 per year for two or
more children. 385 A taxpayer with adjusted gross income of $10,000 or
less receives a credit of 30% of employment-related expenses. The credit
percentage declines by one percentage point for each $2,000 (or fraction
thereof) in adjusted gross income above $10,000, but in no case is the
applicable percentage reduced below 20%. 386 For taxpayers with adjusted
gross incomes greater than $28,000, therefore, the applicable percentage is
20%. For taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $10,000 or less, and
thus qualifying for the highest applicable percentage of 30%, the
maximum credit is $720 for one child, and $1,440 for two or more
children. For taxpayers with incomes in excess of $28,000, and thus
qualifying for the lowest applicable percentage of 20%, the maximum
credit is $480 for one child, and $960 for two or more children.
The amount of the dependent care credit and the applicable percentage
income phase-down schedule have not changed since 1981. Income tax

Deborah H. Schenk, Simplificationfor Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals,
45 TAX L. REV. 121, 127-49 (1989); Zelenak, supra note 8. For a description of the
child tax credit, see supra note 8.
3811.R.C. § 21(a)(2).
382 I.R.C. § 21(b)(2).
383

I.R.C. § 21(a)(1).

384

Section 21(a) refers to "qualifying individuals" rather than children. Section 21(b)(1)

defines "qualifying individuals" as including three categories of individuals: 1) a
dependent under the age of 13; 2) a dependent who is physically or mentally incapable of
self-care; or 3) the spouse of the taxpayer, if physically or mentally incapable of selfcare. I.R.C. § § 21(a), 21(b)(1).
385 .R.C. § 21(c). In addition, the amount of the employment-related expenses may
not
exceed the lower of earned income of the taxpayer or that of the taxpayer's spouse. I.R.C.
§ 21(d)(1). However, if the taxpayer's spouse is a full-time student or incapable of selfcare, a monthly amount of income is deemed to be earned by the spouse in the amount of
$200 (if the $2,400 limit applies), or $400 (if the $4,800 limit applies). I.R.C. § 21(d)(2).
386 I.R.C. § 21(a)(2).

thresholds, however, have substantially increased since then. 387 Thus,
although § 21 appears to target low income taxpayers, the relationship
between the credit percentage income phase-down and current income tax
thresholds makes it unlikely that poor taxpayers receive any benefit from
the credit. The Tax Reform Act of 1986388 removed about six million
poverty level families from the income tax rolls389 by increasing standard
deduction 390 and personal exemption amounts, 39 1 and adjusting those

amounts on a yearly basis for inflation. 392 In 1997, for example, a family
of four (two parents and two children) would owe no taxes on up to
$17,500 of adjusted gross income, 393 which is above the federal poverty
threshold for a family of four. 394 A single head of household with one
child would owe no taxes on up to $11,350 of income, 395 which is above
the poverty level for a family of two. 396 Although both families could be
entitled to a child care tax credit, they would have no income tax liability
to offset through use of the credit. 397 The current thresholds for tax
liability, 398 combined with the nonrefundability of the credit, thus make it

unlikely 9for poor families to benefit from the child and dependent care tax
credit.

39

387

See Forman, supra note 7, at 686.

388

Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.

389

MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME

TAXATION PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 428 (3d ed. 1995).
390 I.R.C. § 63(c)(2).
391 I.R.C. § 15 1(b), (c).
392 I.R.C. § § 63(c)(4) (requiring inflation adjustments to the standard deduction amounts
beginning after 1988), 151(d)(4) (requiring inflation adjustments to the $2,000 personal
exemption amount for tax years beginning after 1989).
393 For 1997, the inflation-adjusted standard deduction amount for a married taxpayer
filing a joint return is $6,900. The inflation adjusted personal exemption amount is
$2,650. Rev. Proc. 96-59, 1996-53 I.R.B. 1. Thus, a family of four claiming a standard
deduction ($6,900) and four exemptions (4 x $2,650 = $10,600) would pay no tax on up
to $17,500 of income.
394 The federal poverty guideline for a family of four is $16,050 for 1997. Notice, Annual
Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,856 (1997).
395 For 1997, the inflation-adjusted standard deduction for a single head of household is
$6,050. The inflation adjusted personal exemption amount is $2,650. Rev. Proc. 96-59,
supra note 96, at § § 3.05, 3.09. The standard deduction ($6,050) plus two personal
exemptions ($5,300) equals $11,350.
396 The federal poverty guideline for a family of two is $10,610
for 1997. See Notice,
supra note 97.
397 Thus, even families below the poverty line would be subject to an applicable
percentage of less than 30%. For example, a family with $14,500 of income would be
entitled to a credit of only 27% of its eligible child care expenses.
398 See Jonathan B. Forman, Simplificationfor Low-Income Taxpayers: Some Options, in
TAXING AMERICA, supra note 13, at 277, 281, tbl.12.1.
399 The Joint Committee on Taxation staff prepares estimates by income class for the
child and dependent care credit. The estimates illustrate the concentration of benefits in
the middle and upper income ranges. 1996 JCT Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra note
82, at 26, tbl. 3, at L-10.

2. The Exclusion for Employer-Provided Dependent Care Assistance
Programs
I.R.C. § 129 provides an exclusion from the gross income of
employees of amounts up to $5,000 paid by the employer under a
dependent care assistance program. 40 The dependent care assistance
program must be a separate written plan of the employer for the exclusive
benefit of employees 40 1 and must meet certain other requirements. 40 2 The
amount of the exclusion may not exceed the lesser of the earned income of
the employee or the earned income of the employee's spouse. 403 Payments
for child care made to the employee's spouse or certain other related
individuals (another
child of the employee, for example) are ineligible for
40 4
exclusion.
Employers most frequently provide the dependent care assistance
benefit through reimbursement accounts, sometimes referred to as flexible
spending accounts, which may also cover other types of expenses, such as
out-of-pocket health care expenses. 40 5 Up to $5,000 may be paid into an
dependent care assistance account (through a salary reduction plan) from
which child care expenses of the employee are reimbursed. The effect of
such a program is that the employee may pay child care expenses (or outof-pocket health care expenses) with pre-tax dollars. Thus, the I.R.C. §
129 exclusion operates as a complete adjustment, offsetting the tax costs
of up to $5,000 of child care expenses, regardless of the taxpayer's
marginal tax rate. About one-third of full-time employees at large and
medium-sized private firms were eligible for such accounts in 1991,
compared to nearly one-tenth of such workers who were eligible for child
care benefits provided by the employer in the form of child care facilities
provided at or near the workplace or through direct reimbursement of
4 6
employee expenses. 0
Generally, taxpayers choose whether eligible child care expenses will
be claimed under the § 21 credit or the § 129 exclusion. Double dipping is

400 I.R.C. § 129(a).
401 I.R.C. § 129(d)(1).
402 I.R.C. § 129(d)(1)-(8) (including requirements that contributions to the
plan not

discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees, id. at (d)(2), and that employees
be notified of the terms and availability of the program, id. at (d)(6)).
403 I.R.C. § 129(b)(1). The same rules as are applicable to the child and dependent care

tax credit apply for determining a deemed amount of earned income for a student spouse
or a spouse incapable of self-care. I.R.C. § 129(b)(2) (incorporating by reference the
provisions of § 21 (d)(2)).

404 I.R.C. § 129(c).
405 1994 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 708 (citing BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN
MEDIUM AND LARGE FIRMS, 1991 (May 1993)).
406

See id.

not permitted. 407 For most middle- or upper-income taxpayers, the § 129
exclusion will provide the most benefit. 40 8 For example, for taxpayers
subject to the highest marginal tax rate of 39.6%, the § 129 exclusion is
worth $1,980409 compared to the maximum § 21 credit of $480 for one
child or $960 for two or more children.
C. Tax Theory: The Implications of Viewing a Child Care Allowance as a
Subsidy or as a Cost of ProducingIncome
As discussed above, Congress has never really decided whether to
conceptualize the child care credit as a cost of earning income, as a
hardship allowance for child care, or as a job development program for
household workers. Tax theorists have also disagreed regarding the proper
treatment of such expenses. 410 If child care expenses are a legitimate cost
of producing income, they should be deductible regardless of the amount
or the taxpayer's income level. 411 But if child care costs are personal
consumption expenditures, they should not be deductible -- just as
expenditures for the costs of food or shelter are nondeductible. 412 Any
special tax allowance for personal consumption expenditures may be
viewed as a tax expenditure, 413 and thus equivalent to a direct subsidy for
child care. The conclusion one reaches with regard to these theoretical

407

See I.R.C. § 21(c) (providing that the amount of employment-related expenses

claimed for purposes of the credit shall be reduced by the amount excludable from gross
income under § 129 for the taxable year).
401 See generally 1994 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 708 ("[T]he credit generally
is
less valuable than the exclusion for taxpayers who are above the 15 percent tax

bracket.").

The dollar value of the exclusion is equal to the value of the child care provided (up to
a maximum of $5,000) times the taxpayer's marginal tax rate ($5,000 x 39.6% = $1,980).
410 Under the Haig-Simons concept of income, which is frequently used in tax
policy
409

analysis, income is defined as the market value of rights exercised in personal
consumption plus the net change in wealth during the taxable period. HENRY C.
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50, 140 (1938); see also ROBERT M.
HAIG, The Concept of Income-- Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in READINGS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959).
411 See Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A ComparativeStudy of Income
Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 64-66 (1971).
412 Personal consumption expenditures are included in the tax base by not allowing a
deduction for personal living expenses. I.R.C. § 262; see Smith v. Commissioner, 40
B.T.A. 1038 (1939) (denying a business expense deduction for child care costs on the
basis that child care was one of the basic functions of family living and thus was a
"personal" concern), affd without opinion, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
413 Under tax expenditure theory, if child care expenses represent personal consumption
expenditures, they ought to be included in the tax base; accordingly, permitting a tax
deduction or credit for child care expenses would constitute a tax preference. STANLEY
S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985) (explaining
that departures from the normal tax structure are tax expenditures or special preferences
and are viewed as equivalent to direct government outlays).

issues may have as much to do with one's view of the family, and the 414
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The following subparts consider whether an adjustment to income to
reflect child care costs can be justified under the tax norms of ability to
pay and neutrality. I conclude that an income tax adjustment for child care
costs should not be viewed as a subsidy because it reflects a taxpayer's
ability to pay taxes. Even if it were viewed as a subsidy or equivalent to a
direct expenditure, however, there are arguments in favor of retaining or
expanding an income tax adjustment for child care expenses. Such an
adjustment should be tolerated as a "second best" solution because it
offsets other tax nonneutralities between wage work and household labor.
Eliminating the "subsidy" would exacerbate already serious allocative
inefficiencies involving participation by women in the labor market.
1. The Ability-to-Pay Norm
The ability-to-pay norm derives from the idea that taxpayers should
contribute to the government according to the relative amount of material
resources they control, above subsistence amounts. Ability to pay may be
understood in both horizontal and vertical equity terms. Questions
concerning the normative underpinnings of the traditional tax policy
equity analysis have recently provoked much commentary, and several
theorists have emphasized that if two taxpayers pay different amounts in
tax, the difference must be consistent with an appropriate theory of
distributive justice.415 Analysis under the traditional tax norm of
horizontal equity, under which similarly situated taxpayers should be
similarly taxed, tends to be conclusory because of the lack of a taxdetermined method of identifying similarly situated taxpayers. For
example, the conclusion reached with regard to horizontal equity may
depend upon whether one begins with a worker with or without children,
416
and how one views one- earner versus two-earner working families.
Thus, the prior question of how taxpayers with equal incomes are
identified determines the outcome of the horizontal equity analysis.
The application of the ability-to-pay norm generally does not favor
deductions unless they relate to minimum subsistence amounts, certain
nondiscretionary expenditures, 417 or legitimate costs of producing income.
See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1389, 1463 (1975).
415 E.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income
Tax, 40
HAST1NGS L. J. 343, 385-94 (1989); see also Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti,
Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV.
607 (1993).
416 See Klein, supra note 67, at 937-40; Brian Wolfman, Child Care, Work, and the
FederalIncome Tax, 3 AM. J. TAX POLY 153,167-74 (1984).
417 See Klein, supra note 67, at 941. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Reform in
414

Canada: The Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 637,

Child care costs reduce the taxpayer's ability to pay taxes only if one
concludes that child care fits within such a category of expenditures. If so,
a deduction or a credit would be justified based on the taxpayer's reduced
capacity to pay taxes.
Debate about the tax treatment of child care costs generally centers on
whether such expenses are personal or business expenses, that is, whether
to treat such expenses as a cost of producing income or as a personal
consumption expenditure. Although the business/personal boundary is
difficult to delineate when the expenses involve additional costs of being
employed, child care has been analogized to nondeductible personal
expenses, such as commuting costs and higher clothing expense, where
the person "already at work" marks the boundary between business and
personal expenses. 418 Some have argued that child care costs may contain
elements of either personal or business expenditures or a mixture of
both,4 19 and at least one commentator has suggested that a limit in the
amount of deductible expenses may be appropriate as a means of
restricting the personal consumption element for middle- or upper-income
42 0
taxpayers.
Arguably, however, child care costs (up to some generally recognized
standard amount for quality care) are legitimate costs of producing
income, and a child care deduction properly reflects a working parent's
ability to pay taxes. A caretaker is required if single or dual parents work
outside of the home, and the tax code should recognize child care as a
deductible work-related expense. But those who view child care costs as a
personal expense would conclude that an income tax adjustment
constitutes a subsidy. Under such a view the neutrality norm becomes
more important because an adjustment to income cannot be justified on
the basis of a working parent's relative ability to pay taxes.
2. The Neutrality Norm
The neutrality norm derives from the notion that taxes should
influence allocation of resources in the economy as little as possible;
otherwise, economic inefficiencies may result. Under the neutrality norm
subsidies are suspect and should be discouraged. For those who view child
care costs as a personal consumption expense, an income adjustment for
such costs would constitute an income subsidy violating the neutrality

638-45 (1968)(discussing the Commission's conclusion that a taxpaying unit's ability to
pay
41 8 taxes is measured by its discretionary economic power).
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: THE LEADING
CASES AND CONCEPTS 6.01(a) (7th ed. 1994); Keane, supra note 67, at 30-35.
419 E.g., Feld, supra note 67, at 429; McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1005-10; see also
Daniel C. Shaffer & Donald A. Berman, Two Cheersfor the Child Care Deduction, 28
TAX L. REV. 535, 535-36 (1973).
420 Wolfman, supra note 119, at 190-93.

norm. The neutrality norm, however, is tempered by several other

theories.
First, under the theory of optimal taxation, nonneutrality does not
result in economic distortions when taxes do not affect consumer or other
allocative choices (that is, where there is a low degree of elasticity or
substitutability of behaviors). 1 Accordingly, because economic

distortions are a function of elasticity, higher taxes may be imposed on
inelastic commodities without creating allocative inefficiencies. Second,

under the Pigouvian theory of taxation, departures from the neutrality
norm may be justified to correct market failures; when free markets do not
work, through the presence of externalities or information failures,
taxation may legitimately correct the failure. 422 For example, an observed
market failure of parents or society to invest adequately in children's

human capital 423 could provide theoretical justification for a tax incentive
to correct such market failure. Third, the theory of the "second best"
suggests that tax nonneutralities should not necessarily be corrected if
allocative inefficiencies
would be aggravated because of the existence of
42 4
other nonneutralities
The theory of the second best provides a justification for a tax
allowance for work- related child care because of the existence of the tax

421 For a more detailed discussion of optimal income taxation, see, e.g., Joseph Bankman

& Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive
Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1919-29 (1987); McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1035-46.
422 See A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE (3d ed. 1947). See
generally
McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1046-53 (1993).
421 Child care costs have been viewed in economic terms as an investment by parents
in
their children's human capital. See Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on Poverty and Failure
in the Market for Children's Human Capital, 81 GEO. L. J. 1945 (1993); see also
Liebman, supra note 10, at 359. The view of child care costs as human capital investment
has not been extensively discussed by tax theorists. Such an analysis would be
problematic. The personal nature of human capital raises serious questions about whether
child care may be viewed as an investment in an "asset" with any measurable payoff for
parents in the form of future support from their children or any other type of income. See
Bittker, supra note 117, at 1447-48 (noting that the concept of children as the "poor
man's capital," or as an informal social security system, has made little headway in the
analysis of American society); Klein, supra note 67, at 940 n.1 18. Even if such questions
were satisfactorily resolved and such expenses treated as investments by parents in their
children, child development expenses would not be deductible under the Code's current
approach to the taxation of human capital investment. See generally Joseph M. Dodge,
Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs--Or Why Costs of Higher Education Should
Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 927, 948-61 (1993).
424 R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV.
ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). The term "second best solution" has been used more generally
to refer to solutions to problems that take into account existing imperfections and tolerate
compensating imperfections. See generally Boris I. Bittker, A "ComprehensiveTax Base"
As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 983-84 (1967); Dodge, supra
note 126, at 941-943.

nonneutrality between wage work and household labor.4 2 5 The tax system
generally favors nonmarket production by failing to tax imputed income
from services taxpayers perform for themselves or their households.4 2 6 For
example, no income tax is imposed on the value of services such as
vegetable gardening, meal preparation, or hair cutting provided by
taxpayers to members of their own households. However, for those
taxpayers who hire others to perform such services, no deductions from
income are generally allowed for the cost of the services. Unless each
taxpayer earns more than the value of the services plus taxes, the tax
system encourages taxpayers to provide the services on an in-kind basis
(assuming that they have or can develop the skill to perform the services).
A deduction for market-purchased services would eliminate the tax
incentive for home production. Alternatively, nonneutrality could be
eliminated by including the imputed income from the in-kind familyprovided services in gross income. Inclusion of imputed income would be
quite problematic, however, due to the administrative difficulties of
valuation and enforcement.
Child care expenses arguably should be treated differently from other
types of nondeductible household expenses because of the necessary
relationship between child care and access to the labor market. 427 The
need for a child care deduction or credit to offset the current tax incentive
for a parent to provide child care at home is typically advanced in the
context of a constellation of other social and economic factors
discouraging women from full labor force participation.4 2 8 Studies suggest
that labor force participation of secondary workers responds to changes in
tax rates, 429 and thus tax nonneutrality between wage work and household
labor may result in allocative inefficiencies. The second best solution of a
tax adjustment for work-related child care achieves special force in a
setting otherwise discouraging women from entering or staying in the
labor market.
D. The Double StandardApplied to Low-Income Taxpayers
As argued above, the tax treatment of child care expenses cannot be
evaluated in isolation from the Code's taxation of the family in general.
Even if one concludes that the child care credit cannot be justified under
the ability-to-pay norm, analysis under the neutrality norm suggests that a
tax allowance for child care costs could be justified as a second best
421 See generally, e.g., Schaffer & Berman, supra note 122, at 537-43 (discussing the

nonneutrality between wage work and house work).
426 Wolfman, supra note 119, 175-81.
427 See Schaffer & Berman, supra note 122, at 543-45 (distinguishing child care from
other self-provided services because of the necessary, although not sufficient,
relationship between the expense and the income earned).
428 See Rachel Connelly, The Effect of Child Care Costs on Married Women's
Labor

Force Participation,74 REV. ECON. & STAT. 83, 90 (1992).
429 Bankman & Griffith, supra note 124, at 1925-27 (discussing studies).

solution to currently existing nonneutralities between wage work and
household labor. I.R.C. § § 21 and 129 offset, at least partially, the effects
of certain policy trade-offs made in connection with taxation of the
family. Thus, the child care allowances should be understood as serving
important structural functions within the tax system. As I have argued
elsewhere, because of the structural role played by these provisions as an
offset to other nonneutralities involving taxation of the family, the child
care tax credit should not be phased out for middle- and upper-income
taxpayers as a means of redirecting benefits to low-income families.
Instead, revenues should be reallocated from other
sources to extend the
430
families.
low-income
to
offsets
such
of
benefits
1. The Policy Trade-Offs Creating Nonneutralities in Taxation of the
Family
Conflicts among the competing tax policy goals of marriage neutrality,
progressivity, and the policy of taxing equal-income married couples
equally 431 have forced inescapable trade-offs in the taxation of the family.
As many analysts have pointed out, it is mathematically impossible to
accomplish all three goals at the same time, and given a progressive rate
structure, nonneutralities may result. 432 The tax system has shifted the
balance among these goals over time as Congress has responded to
changes in social patterns, distributive goals, and prevailing perceptions of
the role of the family in society.
The I.R.C. § 21 child care tax credit and the § 129 exclusion for
employer-provided child care serve an important function as an offset to
current nonneutralities between married and unmarried earners, given the
following features of the current tax structure: (1) the phase-out
433
percentages of the earned income tax credit for low-income workers,
(2) a progressive rate structure, and (3) a joint filing regime for married
taxpayers. Unless these features of the tax structure are altered, the child
care tax provisions should be retained or expanded as a second best
solution.
2. How the Nonneutralities Affect Low-Income Taxpayers
At low income levels, tax costs make working to cover child care
expenses an inherently losing proposition. Although tax costs of working
in the wage labor market are somewhat offset by I.R.C. § § 21 and 129 for
middle- and upper-income taxpayers, low-income taxpayers receive little
or no benefit from those provisions. Thus, the low-income mother
430 See Heen, supra note 44, at 210-17.

431 For a discussion of the "fiction" of marital unity underlying the policy of taxing equal
earning families equally, see Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax, in TAXING AMERICA, supra

note 13, at 25.
432

E.g., Bittker, supra note 117, at 1395-97.

433 See discussion infra part II.D.2.

generally is better off staying at home to care for the children unless she
earns more than it costs to purchase adequate child care, or can rely on
unpaid relatives or low-cost providers for child care.
As has been pointed out by Professor Edward McCaffery, the tax costs
result from a combination of the 15% marginal income tax rate on earned
income above the tax threshold amounts, the 7.65% employee portion of
social security taxes, and the phase-out percentage of the earned income
credit. 4 34 The earned income tax credit is structured to benefit lowincome working families: The amount of the credit initially increases with
earnings, then remains constant as earnings increase, and then decreases
with earnings until it is fully phased out. In 1997, the maximum benefit
for a family with two or more qualifying children is $3,656 (as adjusted
for inflation, equal to 40% of the earned income amount of $9,140). 4 35
The maximum benefit applies at incomes between $9,140 and $11,930,
and declines thereafter. A phase-out percentage (21.06%) applies to
adjusted gross income (or, if greater, the earned income) in excess of
$11,930. Thus, the benefit will be fully phased out at $29,290 of adjusted
gross income for a taxpayer with two or more qualifying children. 436 In
1997, for example, the marginal income tax rate (15%), the employee
portion of social security tax rates (7.65%), and the earned income credit
phase out rate (21.06%) equal a combined tax rate of 43.71%, without
taking into account state taxes and the incidence of the employer portion
of social security taxes.
The earned income tax credit phase-out percentages have the effect of
increasing the marriage penalty for families at low income levels; in
addition, they make the marginal tax rate very high for low-income
families earning at levels within the phase-out range. 437 A possible
offsetting adjustment to these nonneutralities would be to make the child
care tax credit refundable, and to increase the applicable percentage to at
least 50% of an increased level of eligible child care expenses.
Alternatively, § 129 programs could be made available to all employees.

III. CONCLUSION

434 McCaffery, supra note 5, at 10 15-16.
435 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat.

312, 433. The benefit amounts set forth in the text example have been adjusted for
inflation as set forth in Rev. Proc. 96-59, supra note 96, at § 3.03.
436 See I.R.C. § 32(b); see also, e.g., Alstott, supra note 33, at 541-44; Regina T.
Jefferson, The EarnedIncome Tax Credit: Thou Goest Whither? A Critique of Existing
Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 143 (1995);
George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals
to Reform the EarnedIncome Tax CreditProgram, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 225 (1994).
437 See Alstott, supra note 33, at 549-50, 559-64.

The tax double standard as applied to low-income families operates at
cross purposes to current welfare reform proposals, and creates a double
bind for welfare mothers. The problem could be partially addressed by
delivering increased child care benefits through the tax system or through
direct assistance programs, or some combination of the two. More
comprehensive tax policy reforms would require revisiting the policy
trade-offs regarding the use of the joint return, the goal of taxing equal
earning families equally, and the nontaxation of imputed income from
household labor. In the absence of more comprehensive tax reforms, the
policy clash between welfare reform goals and the tax code will require
increased attention by policy-makers to the effects of the family values
double standard as applied to low-income families.

